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The Law's Scientific Revolution: Reflections
and Ruminations on the Law's Use of
Experts in Year Seven of the Revolution
David L. Faigman*
In 1993, the shot was fired that ignited the revolution over the way the
law employs expert knowledge. That shot was Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.' The scientific revolution finally had reached the law.
Now, seven years later, numerous battles have occurred and each side, revolu-
tionary and counter-revolutionary alike, has variously charged the opposition,
fallen back onto the ramparts, and declared victory. However, the view from
the battlefield reveals an abundance of smoke and fire, numerous and ongoing
skirmishes, and considerable confusion. It is clear that this revolution has yet
to reach its denouement. Who shall prevail remains in considerable doubt.
Thus, I offer these observations of the battle as a snapshot of a dynamic
struggle whose conclusion cannot yet be discerned.
Three main camps are involved in the law's scientific revolution, and
they will be my main focus of attention. First are the judges, who occupy the
front-lines; it is in their ranks where the revolution will be won or lost.' The
* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
1. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
2. Another camp is comprised of lawyers. Unfortunately, space does not permit a
thorough examination of this very important constituency. It is a group worthy of extensive
consideration. My impression is that lawyers have joined the revolution in a fairly opportunistic
way. Hence, defense attorneys in civil actions have enthusiastically embraced the law's
scientific reforms. Indeed, this appears to be the area in which the greatest changes have taken
place. All three cases in the Daubert trilogy were civil actions in which the Court ultimately
excluded the evidence and granted defendants' motions for summary judgment Not surpris-
ingly, plaintiffs' attorneys have been the most vehement opponents of Daubert. However, it is
surprising that the criminal defense bar has not been a more fervent Daubert advocate because
so much forensic science evidence appears to falter under close scrutiny. This could be the
result of a couple of factors. First, as the text suggests, trial courts have been less than enthusi-
astic gatekeepers, especially in criminal cases. See infra notes 24-57 and accompanying text.
Thus, criminal defense lawyers may have seen little profit from this course. Second, most
criminal defense work is conducted by over-worked, underpaid, and under-resourced public
defenders. Challenging forensic science expert testimony is a time-intensive and expensive
proposition. Public defenders simply might not have the time and money to do it effectively.
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second camp contains the experts themselves, who comprise most of the not-
so-innocent bystanders that are either swept along or crushed by the revolution
as it passes. Finally, the third group are the legal academics, who playthe part
of either the intelligentsia for the new order, or apologists for the old. Mari-
ano Azuela observed, "Thinkers prepare the revolution, bandits carry it out."1
3
The academics should be responsible for preparing this revolution, and now
the judges and lawyers must carry it out. The experts presently are caught in
the whirlwind, but should join the ramparts or be removed from the field.
L The Courts
The United States Supreme Court is responsible for starting the scientific
revolution in the law and maintaining its energy over the last seven years. In
1993, Justice Blaekmun wrote inDaubertthattrial courts must be gatekeepers
and are responsible for assessing the scientific validity of proffered scientific
expert testimony.4 Daubert was followed by General Electric Co. v. Joiner.'
Importantly, Joiner was authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist," who had con-
curred separately in Daubert to express doubt about the wisdom of making
judges gatekeepers! In Joiner, Rehnquist and the Court not only reiterated
the trial court's obligations to evaluate scientific evidence, but also stressed
that this obligation extended to the conclusions the expert sought to offer.8
The combination of an unreceptive judiciary and an over-worked criminal defense bar may have
conspired to at least slow the revolution in criminal cases.
3. MARIANO AZUELA, THE FLIEs (Lesley Byrd Simpson trans. 1918), quoted in RHODA
THOMAS TIPp, THE INTERNATIONAL THESAURUS OF QUOTATIONS 549 (1970).
4. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating that
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 assigns trial judge task of ensuring that expert testimony is
reliable and relevant to task at hand).
5. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
6. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
7. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 600-01 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (arguing that Rule 702
does not require judges to become "amateur scientists" in order to determine admissibility of
expert testimony).
8. Joiner's main holding, however, departed somewhat from the revolutionary character
of Daubert and, later, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999). The Joiner Court
held that the standard of appellate review for admissibility determinations is abuse of discretion.
Joiner, 522 U.S. at 141-42. In effect, this meant that appellate courts have little gatekeeping
responsibilities themselves. This limited role was repeated and made more restrictive in Kumho
itsel arguably the most revolutionary holding of the three principal cases. See Kumho, 526
U.S. at 152 (extending abuse of discretion standard to trial court's decision about how to deter-
mine reliability of expert testimony). In Kumho, the Court stated that the abuse of discretion
standard extended not merely to the admissibility decision, but also to the factors employed to
make that decision. Id. Therefore, although the Supreme Court's jurisprudence has marked out
an active role for trial courts, it has not seen fit to give those courts the wisdom of appellate
review.
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And in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael,9 the Court took its most significant
step, perhaps, when it held that the gatekeeping role must be applied to all
experts who seek to testify, scientist and non-scientist alike."0 Yet, despite the
High Court's enthusiasm for the scientific revolution - the holdings in all
three cases were unanimous, though with concurrences - lower courts appear
distinctly unenthusiastic for it.'1 Although there are many exceptions to this
statement, 2 and as time passes these exceptions grow in number, the number
of exceptions continues to be too low. At every turn, it seems, numerous
lower courts have sought to frustrate the Daubert reforms."5
After Daubert, those who did not like the idea of judges as gatekeepers
argued that the opinion stressed the liberal nature of the rules and that the
holding was limited to the methods and principles the expert relied upon, not
the conclusions he or she asserted.'4 To be sure, Daubert contained consider-
able language to support the view that more, rather than less, expert testimony
Elsewhere, I have argued that this non-revolutionary role for appellate courts is unwise
and, in fact, unworkable. See generally David L. Faigman, Appellate Review of Scientfic
Evidence Under Daubert and Joiner, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 969 (1997). I will not repeatthat argu-
ment here. Suffice it to say that, as a practical matter, appellate courts are likely to step into the
fray when lower courts in the same circuit disagree about scientific matters that transcend
individual litigation. For instance, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is unlikely
to allow one district judge to exclude handwriting identification analysis because it is generally
unreliable and another to allow it because it is generally reliable. The general fact of the ability
to do handwriting identification, like the general fact whether smoking causes cancer, does not
change from place to place. Appellate courts are likely to frown on glaring inconsistencies
within their jurisdiction, although they probably will correct these inconsistencies under cover
of the abuse ofdiscretion standard. Compare Walker v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 208 F.3d 581, 588
(7th Cir. 2000) (reversing trial court's exclusion of expert testimony) with Weisgram v. Marley
Co., 169 F.3d 514, 522 (8th Cir. 1999) (reversing trial court's admission of expert testimony),
affid, 120 S. Ct. 1011 (2000).
9. 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
10. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,148 (1999) (finding thatDaubert's
gatekeeping rationale is not limited to scientific evidence).
11. See, e.g.,Daubert v. MerrellDowPharms., nc.,43 F.3d 1311, 1315 (9th Cir. 1995)
(Daubert 1), cert denied, 516 U.S. 869 (1995) ("Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of
expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world
than before.").
12. See, e.g., Casey v. Ohio Med. Prods., 877 F. Supp. 1380, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1995)
("Armed with a degree of intellectual curiosity inherent in district court judges, and guided by
two centuries of reviewing the wisdom of other occupations, federal courts will perform the
assigned task.").
13. See infra notes 67-69 (discussing United States v. Starzecpyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027
(S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
14. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 107 F3d 1147,1158 (6th Cir. 1997) (1997) ("Such
a result [that is, excluding asserted 'science' that had for a century been admitted,] truly would
turn Daubert, a case intended to relax the admissibility requirements for expert scientific
evidence, on its head.").
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might be the result of the opinion.'" In particular, the Court found that the
Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate the Frye test,16 which the Court
deemed inherently conservativeY Supporting this conclusion, the Court
observed that a rigid "general acceptance" requirement would be at odds with
the "liberal thrust" ofthe Federal Rules. 8 Moreover, the Court stated that the
trial court's responsibility was limited: "Its overarching subject is the scien-
tific validity - and thus the evidentiary relevance and reliability - of the
principles that underlie a proposed submission. The focus, of course, must be
solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they gener-
ate.""' Thus, the Court appeared to divide responsibility for evaluating
scientific evidence between judge and jury, making admissibility a matter of
methodology and principles and the conclusions a matter of weight to be given
to the jury. Many who found an open door to expert testimony in Daubert
emphasized these statements.2"
Experience soon showed, however, that Daubert had the effect of exclud-
ing a lot of evidence that had been admitted previously.2 Basic application
of the Daubert test requires, at the very least, that judges ask experts: 'What
sorts of tests have you run on your hypotheses, and what do the data indi-
cate?" Judges came to realize that many experts came from disciplines in
which consensus had replaced rigorous study.' Many of these fields have
either no research, or precious little of it. Similarly, the methodology/prin-
ciples distinction mentioned by Justice Blackmun never provided a useful
heuristic to describe the division between the roles of judge and jury. As any
scientist well understands, methodology and conclusions are not severable.
The believability of the testimony (i.e., admissibility) and its persuasive
import (i.e., weight) depend on both the methods used and the conclusions
15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579,588-89 (1993) (finding that
Federal Rules of Evidence did not incorporate "general acceptance" standard of Frye).
16. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (stating that "in admit-
ting expert testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established to have gained general
acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs").
17. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
18. Id.at588.
19. Id. at 594-95.
20. See generally, e.g., Kenneth J. Chesobro, Scienfic Evidence After the Death of Frye:
Daubert and Its Implicationsfor Toxic Tort Pharmaceutical, and Product Liability Cases, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1745 (1994).
21. See cases cited infra note 70 (regarding handwriting expertise)
22. See generally United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999) (regarding
handwriting experts); Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 1529 (ED. Okla. 1995) (regarding
hair identification experts). Psychology, the main subject of the next section, has been a prin-
cipal culprit of this criticism. Psychologists have too often been willing to reach politically
preferred conclusions that are too often supported by little or no research.
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sought to be drawn from that research. In Joiner, the Court largely rejected
the methodology and principles distinction, emphasizing that the trial court
must ensure that the expert's conclusion reasonably follows from the method-
ology and principles that underlie it: "[N]othing in either Daubert or the
Federal Rules of Evidence requires a district court to admit opinion evidence
that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert."'
After Joiner, however, lower courts continued to bridle against the gate-
keeping role.24 This reluctance to conduct substantive evaluations of expert
testimony manifested itself most ardently in courts that found Daub ert did not
apply to so-called non-scientific expert testimony.' This claimed exception
turned out to pose a substantial threat to the entire Rule 702 framework.
Scientific evidence that failed the rigorous dictates of Daubert could reinvent
itself as teclmical or other specialized knowledge and still appear before the
trier of fact.26 But the Kumho Court recognized this ruse for what it was and
held that the gatekeeping role extended to all expert testimony.'
Since Daubert, the Supreme Court steadily has insisted that expert testi-
mony be based on reliable methods and that trial courts have the responsibil-
ity to conduct this assessment.' Just recently, in Weisgram v. Marley Co.,'
the Court stated unequivocally the critical perspective that undergirds
Daubert.3 ° Weisgram examined whether an appellate court has the authority
to order judgment as a matter of law after finding that the trial court abused
its discretion in admitting plaintiff's expert testimony.31 In Weisgram, the
Court considered whether the plaintiff should be afforded the opportunity
to retry the case with a different set of experts.32 The Court, with Justice
Ginsburg writing, rejected this argument, stating that plaintiffs should not be
given two bites at the apple if their experts later are found to fail the Daubert
test on appeal:
23. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
24. See generally, e.g., Carmichael v. Samyang Tire Co., 131 F-3d 1433 (1 lth Cir. 1997),
rev'd, Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
25. Id. at 1436.
26. See infra notes 67-69 and accompanying text (discussing United States v. Starzec-
pyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)).
27. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,148(1999) (finding thatDaubert's
gatekeeping rationale is not limited to scientific knowledge).
28. Id. at 147-49; General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136,142 (1997).
29. 120 S. Ct 1011 (2000).
30. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct 1011, 1021 (2000) (noting that Daubert
discourages parties from failing to put on "their best expert evidence in the expectation of a
second chance").
31. Id. at 1015.
32. Id. at 1016.
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Since Daubert,... parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of
the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet. It is
implausible to suggest; post-Daubert, that parties will initially present
less than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance
should their first try fail. We therefore find unconvincing [the plain-
tiff's] fears that allowing courts of appeals to direct the entry ofjudg-
ment for defendants will punish plaintiffs who could have shored up
their cases by other means had they known their expert testimony would
be found inadmissible.33
Not surprisingly, many lower courts continue to resist.34 Some simply
ignore their responsibility, paying no more than lip-service to their obligations
and offering conclusory statements that the evidence is reliable35 or that the
expert has sufficient experience with the subject. 6 This tactic appears espe-
cially attractive to courts confronting purely experiential-based testimony,
such as prosecutorial use of law enforcement officers who testify on whether
the drugs found were likely to be possessed with an intent to distribute,37 or
on the organizational structure of gangs or organized crime. 8 Another trend
just emerging among some courts is to quote and rely on a passage inKumho39
that suggests that the inquiry concerns whether the expert "employ[ed] in the
courtroom the same level of intellectual rigor that characterizes the practice
33. Id. at 1021 (citations omitted).
34. See 1 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND
SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY § 1-3.4.1, at 15-17 (1997 & Supp. 2000) (discussing lower
courts' continued resistance to gatekeeping role).
35. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Kerik, No. 75 CIV. 3073 HB., 2000 WL 278085, at *1
(S.D.N.Y Mar. 14, 2000) (finding expert testimony met reliability requirements of Rule 702,
but failing to explain how such requirements were met).
36. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Ford Motor Co., No. 97 CIV 0593 (RCC), 2000 WL 343777,
at *5 (S.DN.Y. March 31, 2000) (allowing testimony of safety engineer based on experience
of investigating approximately 15,000 road accidents and preparing approximately 10,000
reports based on these investigations). The court did not reflect on the fact that for the expert
to have investigated 15,000 accidents, he must have visited approximately 1.5 accident scenes
everyday for 30 years.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, 192 F.3d 580,589 (6th Cir. 1999) (finding district
court did not abuse its discretion in allowing officer to testify regarding usual methods of drug
traffickers).
38. See, e.g., United States v. Hankey,203 F.3d 1160,1169 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that
extensive voir dire of expert witness by district court was sufficient to assess relevance and
reliability of witnesss testimony); United States v. Tocco, 200 F.3d 401,419 (6th Cir. 2000)
(finding that expert witness testimony regarding "inner-workings of organized crime" is both
relevant and reliable under Daubert).
39. See Bryant v. City of Chicago, 200 F.3d 1092,1098 (7th Cir. 2000) (allowing expert
who had brought same intellectual rigor to courtroom, despite not meeting any Daubert factors);
Skidmore v. Precision Printing & Packaging, Inc., 188 F.3d 606, 618 (5th Cir. 1999) (same).
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of an expert in the relevant field."4 For some courts, unfortunately, this
standard has become the test."
The problem with the same intellectual rigor test is obvious. It is, in
effect, a restatement of the general acceptance prong of Daubert, taken from
the language of Frye. It suffers all of the problems associated with the worst
abuses of that test.42 Specifically, if the field is bankrupt of data or not
especially rigorous in its testing of hypotheses, courts will not get very reli-
able opinion testimony. The Daubert query is not simply whether the expert
is using the same intellectual rigor in court that he or she would use in the
field. Daubert asks whether the expert testimony itself is based on a suffi-
ciently rigorous research foundation.4" Surely, if an expert fails to use the
same intellectual rigor used in the field, he or she should be excluded. But an
expert's use of the same intellectual rigor inthe courtroom as inthe field does
not ensure reliable testimony if the field itself is not rigorous. The same
intellectual rigor test is a necessary, but not a sufficient, criterion for admis-
sion. From astrology to certain forensic and psychological opinion, courts
will not be receiving good evidence if they merely rely on the intellectual
rigor accepted in the field. Simply put, many fields of expertise lack intellec-
tual rigor, and courts must recognize when this is so. The whole point of
Daubert was to require courts to assess the fields themselves and not defer to
the guilds that bring their so-called expertise to the courtroom.'
Lower courts' reluctance to embrace Daubert appears to be attributable
to three concerns on their part. First, courts have been surprised and cha-
grined at the seeming outcomes of a faithful application of the Daubert test
to all expert testimony.4 A lot of previously admitted evidence, especially
evidence offered by prosecutors, appears excludable for want of a research
base.46 A second consideration is that judges and lawyers find themselves
inadequately trained in the scientific method.47 Although few would assert
that judges need to become amateur scientists, the gatekeeping role expects
40. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137,152 (1999).
41. See cases cited supra note 39.
42. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
43. See Weisgram v. Marley Co., 120 S. Ct. 1011, 1021 (2000) ("Since Daubert...
parties relying on expert evidence have had notice of the exacting standards of reliability such
evidence must meet").
44. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993) (stating that
"trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony is not only relevant, but reliable").
45. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text
46. See infra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
47. SeeDAvrDL. FAIaMAN, LEGALALcEmY: TBEUSE AND MISUSE OF SciENCErNTHE
LAw 53-54 (1999) (noting "legal consumers of scientific research often have little understand-
ing of the product they are buying").
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judges to have at least enough knowledge to evaluate a program of research.4"
This is a daunting task for judges with little background in the scientific
method and statistics. Courts' third concern, which is closely related to the
second, is the seeming enormity of the task and, frankly, the intellectual dif-
ficulty involved in integrating the scientific culture into the law.49
The fact that many kinds of previously admitted expertise stumble under
Daubert scrutiny is a peculiar source of judicial concern.5" One might even
expect a judicial outcry against the sloppy way that prosecutors have gone
about verifying the expert evidence upon whichthey so often rely. In any case,
the lack of data is a defect that can be remedied readily. Many ofthe forensic
sciences that now are bereft of data, from arson investigation to firearms iden-
tification, could be tested readily with relatively minimal effort."' The primary
reason they have not yet tested their expertise is that courts have not required
them to do so. For instance, if courts begin uniformly to exclude handwriting
identification analysis, the research almost certainly will be done. Law en-
forcement agencies have too much to lose notto invest in this research. In fact,
this is an unexpected windfall of Daubert: Fields that, until now, have relied
on the limited tools of observation and experience will begin to test more rigor-
ously their hypotheses and their proficiency to do what they claim they can do.
The second matter, lack of scientific sophistication, also should trouble
trial courts less than it does. Understandably, judges feel unable to devote the
time necessary to learn the basics of science. Judges typically are very busy
people, and becoming well-versed in the scientific method takes time and
substantial effort. Moreover, though they are less likely to admit this fear, the
risk of embarrassment is not insubstantial in this domain. No one wants to
confuse a slope and an intercept when describing a regression line.52 But,
increasingly, there are a surfeit of state and federal programs dedicated to
assisting judges learn the science. 3 There are also treatises that offer guid-
ance specifically directed at a legal audience.54 And perhaps most helpfully,
48. See Stephen Breyer, Introduction to REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
2 (2d ed. 2000) ("Our decisions should reflect a proper scientific and technical understanding
so that the law can respond to the needs of the public.").
49. See FAIGmAN, supra note 47, at 190-204 (discussing process of integrating scientific
information into policy formation).
50. See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
51. See l FAIGMANET AL., supra note 34, § 20-5.0, at 12-17 (discussing application of
scientific method to forensic science).
52. See 1 id. § 3-5.3.1, at 134 (explaining these terms and their relevance to regression
analysis).
53. Examples include week-long programs by the National Judicial College in Reno,
Nevada, and one and two day programs organized by the Federal Judicial Center.
54. See generally FAIGMAN ET AL., supra note 34; PAUL C. GIANNEL1 & EDWARD J.
IMwINauE, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE (3d ed. 1999); REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIIC
EVIDENCE (2d ed. 2000).
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judges can receive assistance from court-appointed experts. Indeed, there are
several organizations with programs designed to identify neutral (i.e., unaffihi-
ated) experts for this purpose."5 Having an expert from the field to discuss the
complexities of the science greatly should improve judges' comprehension of
the research and relieve their fears of making a holding or writing an opinion
that delves deeply into the subject.
The third concern, the question of integrating the scientific culture into
the law, is not without its difficulties and is likely to prove to be the most
demanding challenge to the law and science connection over time. I have
considered this subject elsewhere in book-length form.56 Suffice it to say here
that judges and lawyers must remember that they are using science ultimately
for their own institutional purposes.57 Law and science do not have an identity
of interests nor do they share objectives. Science is a supremely useful means
for investigating the facts of the world. But more often than not, and almost
invariably in the area of applied science (of the sort the law cares about), facts
are known with more or less confidence. Lawmakers ultimately must decide
how much confidence they need in a fact before making a decision. This is
not to say that law can be lazy about its understanding of science because so
much of the equation involves policy judgments. Indeed, just the opposite is
true. Law must fully appreciate what the scientific method has to offer. It is
not possible to make sound science policy without a competent understanding
of both policy and science. The law must decide how insistent it should be
that the science be done and what it should expect from experts who claim
special knowledge of the real-world.
ff. The Experts
At a conference that the American Psychological Association and the
American Bar Association organized in October 1999, 1 attended a panel dis-
cussion that included, among other notable panelists, Justice Stephen Breyer.
It was a fairly interesting panel, though the panelists tended to avoid the more
salient and more controversial issues that now confront the relationship
between science and the law. The conference organizers asked Justice Breyer
55. Two programs, in particular, are worth mentioning. The American Association for
the Advancement of Science (AAAS) has just recently begun to compile lists of scientists who
might be available to courts. See generally CourtAppointed Scientific Experts: A Demonstra-
ion Project of theAAAS, at http'/www.aaas.org/spp/case/case.htm (last visited Sept 15, 2000)
(copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review). A similar program has been put together
by the Private Adjudication Center at Duke University. See generally The Registy oflndepend-
ent Scientific and Technical Advisors: A Program of the Private Adjudication Center Duke
Universi ySchool of Law, athttp'/Avww.law.duk.edulpa/regis& /mdexhtm (last visited Sept
15,2000) (copy on file with Washington and Lee Law Review).
56. See generally FAIGMAN, supra note 47.
57. See id. at 56-57 (discussing institutions of law and science and their mutual interests
and jealousies).
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to be on the panel because he authored the Court's opinion in Kumho. Hence,
a key component of the panel's discussion inevitably concerned the effect
Kumho would have on experts who specialize in the psychological sciences.
I want to give some attention to this matter because I have given it a fair
amount of thought.5 8 My main objective in this section, however, is to re-
spond to a related issue which came by way of a question that Justice Breyer
directed to the audience. The audience was composed primarily of psycholo-
gists. He asked at one point: What is good psychology, and how can courts
recognize it? The problem of defining successful scientific fields, successful
history, or successful accounting turns outto be a rather important matter, and
the success of the Daubert trilogy depends on the answer. Yet, no one rose
to the challenge of offering an answer at that time. I am sorry that I did not,
but I would like to redress that failure here. Although the points made below
apply equally to a host of other fields, I will use psychology to consider this
issue because it was the subject of Justice Breyer's query.
My short answer to Justice Breyer's question is that psychology is good
when it employs the critical and rigorous methods ofscience to test hypotheses,
including hypotheses regarding psychologists' abilities to make forensic assess-
ments. The second, albeit related, part of Breyer's question involves telling
courts how they can recognize good science when they see it. But science is not
recognizable in the sense that anyone could offer a recipe for how it is done.
Like Justice Stewart's observation regarding obscenity, we know it when we
see it.59 But this is not very helpful because it gives little direction or guidance.
Thomas Huxley observed that: "Science is nothing but trained and organized
common sense... .,"' Huxley, however, understood well the very high levels
of training and organization necessary to turn common sense into science.
Teaching the scientific method to judges who have no training in, or under-
standing of, the scientific culture is like trying to explain proximate cause to
someone who has not gone to law school. The concept of proximate cause is
embedded in the legal culture and is not easily disentangled from it. Under-
standing the scientific method requires knowing the culture of science.
In answering Justice Breyer's question, then, it is necessary to consider
the scientific culture because it is, or should be, the foundation of the psycho-
logical expertise that comes to the courts. This matter cannot be approached
without contemplating the nature of knowledge itself and alternatives to
58. See generally David L. Faigman, The Evidentiary Status of Social Science Under
Daubert" IsIt "Scientific," "Technical, "or "Other" Knowledge?, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. PoL'Y. &
L. 960 (1995); David L. Faigman, To Have and Have Not. Assessing the Value of Social
Science to the Law as Science and Policy, 38 EMORY L.J. 1005 (1989).
59. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).
60. ADICTIONARY OF SCIENTIFIC QUOTATIONS 126 (AlanL. Mackayed., 1991) (quoting
Thomas Henry Huxley, The Method of Zadig, in COLLECTED ESSAYS IV (1894)).
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scientific knowledge. The Federal Rules divide expert knowledge into catego-
ties of scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge.' These are all
parts of what might be termed empirical knowledge, or knowledge of the real
world. But the Rules contain an unstated duality, for missing in them is what
might be called non-empirical knowledge or values. The Rules of Evidence,
therefore, divide the world into two basic categories, empirical knowledge and
non-empirical knowledge, with science being one sort of empirical knowledge.
Expert testimony is limited to opinions about the empirical world that are
based on good grounds. That non-empirical knowledge is not within the
purview of an expert is hardly a shocking statement because the expert is in
court to assist the trier of fact, not to make policy. Thus, the definition of
empirical knowledge under the Rules, and whether psychology sometimes
qualifies, must take into account its opposite, norms or values.
In some sense, all of human existence is dual in nature. Dark is defined
by light, white by black, up by down, good by evil, and empirical science by
normative values. An ancient Buddhist observation illustrates this point:
The nonverbal, concrete world contains no classes and no symbols which
signify or mean anything otherthanthemselves. Consequently it contains
no duality. For duality arises only when we classify, when we sort our
experiences into mental boxes, since aboxis no box without an inside and
an outside.62
Life would be simple if these dualities were merely categorical. But we know
this to be untrue because dark dawns into light, white grays into black, and
science embeds and informs values. Justice Breyer's question, therefore, is
not so simple. Indeed, the general subject has occupied philosophers ever
since the dark ages brightened into the Enlightenment. Hence, though I have
no pretensions of being able to answer the question definitively, it is a ques-
tion worthy of sustained attention.
The Daubert trilogy is about drawing the line between valid empirical
knowledge and value-driven empirical speculation. Sometimes, the values
driving the speculation are pecuniary gain, and at other times politically pre-
ferred legal outcomes. Obviously, testimony bought for $1000 per day is an
affront to the expert's designated role, but no less obnoxious is testimonythat
is the product of an overweening conscience. Whatever the motivation, then,
Daubert instituted the judge as gatekeeper in order to block such speculation
from the courtroom.63
61. FRD.R.E iD. 702.
62. ALANW.WATrs, THE WAYOF ZEN 73 (1957).
63. See Daubert v. MerrHl Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993) (stating that
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 assigns trial judge task of ensuring that expert testimony is
reliable and relevant to task at hand).
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The line between science and speculation is, at best, indistinct. The line
drawing problem is marked especially in the law because most evidence codes
allow experts to testify to more than just scientific knowledge. This was the
subject ofKumho.' 4 InKumho, as noted above, the Court considered whether
the gatekeeping role articulated in Daubert applied to non-scientific evidence
or, in the language of the Federal Rules of Evidence, technical or other
specialized knowledge.6' After Daubert was decided, a lot of formerly proud-
to-be-sciences came very quickly to describe themselves as specialties in order
to avoid the apparently rigorous dictates of the Daubert test. Particularly
good examples of-this were the handwriting identification specialists, formerly
members of the proud forensic sciences. Amazingly, it actually worked in
several cases. In United States v. Starzecpyzel,s for instance, Judge McKenna
concluded that if handwriting identification were a science it would not be
admitted under Daubert.67 However, because they were specialists, they could
testify.' Kumho closed this loophole.69 And since Kumho was decided, three
federal courts have prohibited handwriting identification experts from testify-
ing to authorship because they have failed so farto collect the data that would
validate their ability to do this.
7 °
Psychology might present similar issues. I gave a presentation on
Daubert at the August 1993 annual meeting of the American Psychology
Association, which was shortly after Daubert had been decided. I blithely
assumed that Daubert was applicable to psychology and considered it a
warning shot across the field's bow. Immediately after the talk, a gentleman
came up to me and said that he did notthinkDaubert applied to his profession
because he was a clinician and thus qualified as a specialist under the Rules
of Evidence. I realized then that Daubert had a back door through which all
sorts of experts might crawl, having been turned away at the front door of
scientific knowledge. Kumho, as noted, closed this particular back door."
64. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 146 (1999) (considering whether
trial court may utilize Daubert factors in determining admissibility of engineering expert's
testimony).
65. Id.
66. 880 F. Supp. 1027 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
67. United States v. Starzeepyzel, 880 F. Supp. 1027, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
68. Id. at 1047.
69. See Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152 (requiring reliability assessment be done for all expert
testimony).
70. See generally United States v. Santillan,Nc. CR-96-40169,1999WL 1201765 (N.D.
Cal. 1999); United States v. Hines, 55 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. Mass. 1999); Transcript of Pretrial
Hearing on Daubert Issues, United States v. McVeigh, No. 96-CR-68, 1997 WL 47724 (D.
Colo. Feb. 5, 1997).
71. See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text
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But many windows remain through which bad science might yet seek entry
into the citadel - including bad psychological science.
Kumho forces us to look hard at what experts do, both as scientists and as
specialists. In short, Kumho asks us to reflect on how we know what we think
we know. This, of course, is the essence of the scientific method. Science,
contrary to what some courts think, is not an item to be described, detailed, or
defined. It is a path to knowledge, not knowledge itself. Hence, when the
Federal Rules of Evidence speak of scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge, they are talking about approaches that might be taken to gain
knowledge and the expert opinion that is based on that knowledge. Science,
especially applied science, tends to know the world with a good deal of
uncertainty attached to that knowledge. We know whether the Georgia death
penalty scheme discriminates on the basis of the race of the victim only with
more or less confidence.72 We know that people have difficulty with eyewit-
ness identifications when there is a weapon present only with more or less
confidence." Finally, we know that a sexual offender is likely to be violent
again in the future only with more or less confidence.74 Whether we act on
that knowledge and how we act on it is a policy choice, hopefully flowing
from a careful calculation ofthe costs of making an error, whether ofthe false
positive or false negative variety.
The key to being a good scientist is, of course, to be self-critical. Thus,
Karl Popper and the Court in Daubert used the notion of falsification to
describe the process of hypothesis testing." The underlying point is that only
when hypotheses survive myriad attempts to falsify them do we gain enough
confidence to believe them. Hence, if we believe that cross-racial identifi-
cations are less reliable than same-race identifications, research should
rigorously test this hypothesis by subjecting it to tests that would falsify
it. The logic of the null hypothesis is that we should not accept our pet
hypothesis - the alternative hypothesis - until we have no choice based on our
rules of decision. Konrad Lorenz advised that: "It is a good morning exercise
for a research scientist to discard a pet hypothesis everyday before break-
72. See discussion infra notes 85-92 and accompanying text.
73. See generally Thomas H. Kramer et al., Weapon Focus, Arousal, and Eyewitness
Memory, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 167 (1990) (discussing phenomenon of "weapon focus,"
whereby witness to crime concentrates on criminal's weapon rather than other details of crime);
Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., SomeFactsAbout Weapon Focus, 11 LAW & HUM. BESAv. 55 (1987)
(same).
74. See generally Marie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, The Scienfific Status of Research on
SexualAggressors, in 3 MODERN SCIENTIFIc EvIDENCE: TEE LAW AND SCIUNCE OF EXPERT
TESnMONY § 36-2.0 (David L. Faigman et al. eds., 1999) (discussing recidivism among sexual
aggressors).
75. Daubert v. Mrrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993) (discussing falsi-
fliability as criterion oftest).
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fast.0 6 Yet, in study after study, researchers almost invariably conclude with
suggestions for policy reform based on relatively scanty data. Moreover,
whether policy should change because the data point in one direction is, in the
ordinary case, not at all obvious.
Not only must psychologists be self-critical, but psychology, as a field,
needs to critically appraise itself. Researchers should be out there trying to
falsify one another's pet hypotheses. When researchers at the University of
Utah announced cold fusion, laboratories around the country immediately
went to work trying to test it.77 Admittedly, cold fusion lent itself better to
testing than many psychological hypotheses, but the attitude is most impor-
tant. Possibly because psychologists, especially psychologists who do work
that is applicable to the law, are interested in socially and politically divisive
issues, going against the grain is difficult and, indeed, potentially perilous. In
short, many researchers do not conduct rigorous testing or evaluate the testing
that they and others conduct because they are concerned about being politi-
cally incorrect. This phenomenon is not unlike what early scientists in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries must have experienced with the censor-
ship that accompanied findings and inventions that contravened church doc-
trine.7 In our time, the rape trauma syndrome, the battered woman syndrome,
repressed memories, post-traumatic stress disorder, and child abuse accommo-
dation syndrome all represent accession to holy writ.
There is no simple solution to this problem, though I think that if experts
realize that their politically correct science sometimes can be used for politi-
cally incorrect outcomes, then they will, at least, take a more sober view of
what they are doing. If children are competent enough to participate in the
decision whether to be institutionalized in a mental hospital, are they compe-
tent enough to be tried as adults and possibly suffer capital punishment? More
and more, the biggest consumers of the battered woman syndrome over the
last several years are prosecutors who are using it to elude the character evi-
dence rules in their prosecutions of alleged batterers.79 Even more politically
incorrect, prosecutors increasingly are seeking to subject women-defendants
-who claim to be suffering from the battered woman syndrome and post-trau-
matic stress disorder to state psychiatric examinations."0 Finally, researcher-
76. THE OxFoRD DICTIoNARY OF QUoTATIONS 428 (Angela Partington ed.,4th ed. 1992)
(quoting KoNAD LORENZ, ONAGGESIoN (1966)).
77. See generafly GARY TAUBEs, BAD ScENCE: THE SHORT LIFm AND WEiRD T)EAS OF
COLD FUSION (1993) (discussing cold fusion research).
78. See FAIGMAN, supra note 47, at 14-18 (discussing trial ofGalileo).
79. See David L. Faigman & Amy J. Wright, The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age
of Science, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 67, 96-99 (1997) (discussing issues concerning prosecutorial use
of battered woman syndrome).
80. See, e.g., State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 172, 176 (Fla. 1993) (concluding that woman
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advocates in this area claim that the battered woman syndrome is associated
with or functionally equivalent to post-traumatic stress disorder." However,
this move totally ignores the underlying realities of the legal defenses these
psychological constructs were meant to serve. The battered woman syndrome
is directed to classic self-defense, which is based on justification. Post-
traumatic stress disorder is directed at excuse based defenses. It would not be
surprising to see some zealous prosecutor one day seek to civilly commit a
woman who is acquitted on the basis that she suffered from a combination of
battered woman syndrome and post-traumatic stress disorder. And in the area
of the rape trauma syndrome, defendants increasingly are seeking to use this
evidence, a move that deeply threatens the reforms of the 1970s that led to
enactment of rape shield statutes across the country."
Psychologists in this area too often measure their success by how much
impact their research has on specific cases or on the development of the law.
This is wrong on at least two levels. First of all, it is wrong if, as scientists,
they have a political agenda that they set out to achieve by conducting re-
search that gives them the facts to support their opinions. Indeed, this is
probably exactly the opposite of what research agendas are supposed to be
about. I think this happens more often than it should, but the obviousness of
the problem is clear enough that I need not dwell on it. But, let me just say
that, as a profession, psychology ought to stand up and state clearly that polit-
ical agendas masquerading as science are not acceptable. Practical politics is
fundamentally inconsistent with science. As Henry Adams remarked: "Prac-
tical politics consists in ignoring facts."83
The second reason it is wrong is somewhat less obvious. It is wrong
because when psychologists measure their success by immediate results,
measured by number of citations by courts, they fail to do the research that is
necessary to have a lasting impact on the legal profession. Take, for instance,
the area of mental competency of children. A lot of the research in this area
uses legal constructs of competency as the operational definitions for the
work.84 One of the results of this framework is that little attention is paid to
who raises battered woman syndrome as defense may waive her right to refuse to submit to
examination by state's expert).
81. See Lenore A. Walker, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder in Women: Diagnosis and
Treatment ofBattered Woman Syndrome, 28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 21, 22 (1991) (comparing bat-
tered woman syndrome to post-traumatic stress disorder).
82. See 1 FAIGMANETAL, supra note 34, § 10-1.5, at 412 (discussing defense use of rape
trauma syndrome).
83. THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 2 (Angela Partington ed., 4th ed. 1992)
(quoting HENRY ADAMS, TB EDUCATION OF-ENRYADAMS (1907)).
84. See generally, e.g., THOMAS GRIsso, JUVENMLS' WAVIVR OF RIGM: LEGAL AND
PSYCHOLOGICAL COMPETENCE (1981).
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the broader psychological considerations that might be considered and that
might allow generalizations to be made across legal contexts. This also limits
the value of the research ifthe legal formulations should change. Rather than
relying on legal conceptions of mental competency, psychologists should be
doing more to convince courts of the value of psychological conceptions of
competency. This might mean that their research seemingly will be ignored
for a time because courts might be disinclined to adopt alternative conceptions
of mental competency than what precedent directs. But, over time, psycholo-
gists would have much greater influence on the law by conducting psychologi-
cally sound research than with the current approach, which appears to be little
more than a fixation on winning some immediate cases before the courts.
When psychologists focus on whether courts and legislatures adopt their
pet hypotheses, they select the wrong outcome variable to measure their
success. Consider, for example, the research conducted by David Baldus and
his colleagues that indicated that the Georgia capital sentencing scheme
discriminated on the basis of the race of the victim.8" Those convicted of
killing whites were 4.3 times more likely to get the death penalty than those
who killed blacks." Many saw the Baldus study as a failure because the
Supreme Court seemingly ignored it inMcCleskey v. Kemp." InMcCleskey,
the Court concluded that discrimination on the basis of the race of the victim
did not violate either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, unless the peti-
tioner could show individualized discrimination.88 But the Baldus study, the
Court explained, merely indicated a discrepancy that appears to correlate with
race.89 The Court further pointed out that "[e]ven Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove that race enters into any capital sentencing
decisions or that race was a factor in McCleskey's particular case."' The
Court thus concluded that the research was largely irrelevant to the constitu-
tional question presented.9'
In fact, however, the Baldus study was a great success. Itforcedthe Court
to face the realities of this discrimination, when the Court clearly would have
preferred to say that there was no evidence of discrimination. Because the
85. See DAVID C. BALDus ET AL., EQUAL JusTICE AND THE DEATm PENALTY 312-69
(1990) (discussing research on Georgia capital sentencing scheme).
86. Id. at 344.
87. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
88. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292, 308 (1987) (concluding that sentence
did not violate Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments).
89. See id. at 312 ("[The Baldus study indicates a discrepancy that appears to correlate
with race.").
90. Id. at 308.
91. See id. at 313 (holding that Baldus study does not demonstrate constitutionally signif-
icant risk of racial bias in Georgia's capital sentencing process).
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study indicated systemic disparities based on race, the Court suffered a blow
to its legitimacy in not coming to grips with the realities ofthis discrimination.
The research prompted legislatures and conscientious prosecutors to review
the matter. It also sparked numerous law review articles.' Finally, and I see
it every year when I teach the case to my Science and Law class, the research
influences how students understand the case and how they see the Court.
It is both myopic and ironic that so many psychologists measure the
success of legally relevant psychological science on whether courts cite it. It
is myopic because the legal system is far broader than court opinions and
science's value has to be larger than what the current generation of jurists
recognizes. It is ironic because most psychologists, as is true for most scien-
fists, have little respect for the empirical acumen ofthe average judge, yetthey
are thrilled when judges write of the value and validity of their research.
So, is it possible for scientists to offer policy prescriptions for the law?
This, of course, is the multi-million-dollar question.93 Moreover, it is not a
question that is limited, by any means, to the psychological sciences. A recent
issue of Science devoted substantial space to this very issue as it concerned
ecologists. 4 Among ecologists, a growing number are, as the story put it,
sticking their necks out to inform policy makers about not only their data, but
what should be done with their data.' Other ecologists fear that this practice
confuses them with environmental activists.' This confusion is thought to
lead to a discounting of their statements regarding the science because those
statements are perceived as being suffused with opinion.' Others take a very
different view. As Stuart Pimm argued, "I have a moral responsibility as a
citizen to make people aware of what the science means."'  The danger, of
course, is that when the science does not support scientist-advocates' policy
views, they might be inclined to discount or ignore it.99 Hence, if it turns out
that biodiversity is not healthier to all ecosystems, an ecologist devoted to
biodiversity will fear recognizing this research because it might fuel his or her
political enemies' arguments against conservation."ec
92. See generaly, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punish-
men, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388 (1988) (criticizing Court's decision in
McCleskey and analyzing equal protection aspect of case).
93. It used to be the $64,000 question, but times have changed.
94. Jocelyn Kaiser, Ecologists on a Mission to Save the World, 287 ScIENCE 1188 (2000).




99. Id. at 1191.
100. Id. at 1190-91.
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The psychological sciences, of course, are well along the path to being
considered little more than handmaidens for particular political points of view.
This is unfortunate and perhaps will not soon change. But psychologists
should seek to change it, both for the sake of their science and for the sake of
the law. Scientists serve neither themselves nor the law well if they are
nothing more than mere technicians for lawyers' views of psychology or,
worse yet, advocates for their own views that they peddle as the latest scien-
tific discovery. Today, psychology's value to the law is fairly broad but not
very deep. In most areas, psychology is little more than one of many interest
groups trying to get its policies enacted through legislation or court decision.
As a profession, psychology should take a broader view of its relevance and
a more humble view of its ability to supply answers to short-term discrete
questions.
Psychologists should hesitate before seeking to bring their findings to
policymakers, fearful that when tested the research might be thought not-yet-
done. Again, consider the example of the battered woman syndrome, a
psychological construct with unparalleled success in the law. In 1985, which
would have been thought more likely? That by the year 2000 we would have
mapped virtually the entire human genome, or that we would know what
percentage of women in violent relationships are in constant fear and how that
fear is tied to the so-called cycle theory of violence? Psychologists' research
sometimes seems designed more to get them on the witness stand than to
understand the phenomenon that they are studying.
I do not mean to reject entirely the post-modem insight that objectivity
in science cannot be wholly achieved. Without question, scientists' attitudes
and their politics affect the hypotheses they generate and the studies they
design to test them. But this insight should not lead them to abandon pursuit
of scientific objectivity; it should lead them to seek it with greater ardor.
From double-blind methods to replication, the scientific method should root
out prejudice, bias, and preconception. Claude Bernard, writing in 1865, said:
"[E]xperiments must always be devised in view of a preconceived idea, no
matter if the idea be not very clear nor very well defined. As for noting the
results of the experiment, ... we must here, as always, observe without a
preconceived idea."'01 Too much research in law and psychology is driven by
the ends of legal policy. This approach, although maybe effective in the short
term - and maybe not - is doomed to the trash heap of yesterday's politics.
What, then, should be the objectives of psychologists who conduct
legally relevant research? While individual research goals necessarily will
vary within the field, the goal should not be to accomplish specific short term
101. CLAUDE BERNARD,ANINTRODUCInON TO THE STUDY OF EXPERIMENAL MEDICINE
23 (Henry Copley Greene trans., Dover Publications ed. 1957) (1865).
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objectives or to measure success by the number of legal citations garnered.
The law, through cases like Daubert and its progeny, has begun the long trek
toward scientific sophistication. It would be unfortunate, indeed, if psychol-
ogy should prove unworthy of this more sophisticated scrutiny.
Law and science are separate institutions and they bring different objec-
tives to the law and science connection. The law should seek the integration
of scientific knowledge into its decision making. But it is the law's paradigm
that is incorporating science, ultimately for its own institutional purposes.
Psychology should seek to develop and test hypotheses concerning human
behavior, some of which will be helpful to the law. Psychology's institutional
interests are different than the law's. For psychology, the triumph lies in
explaining human behavior, not in the sale of their explanations to lawyers
and judges. Just because they can sell "The Battered Woman Syndrome" to
judges and legislators does not mean that it is true. Furthermore, just because
they cannot sell the realities of the unreliability of predictions of violence does
not mean that the phenomenon is false.
Those psychologists who specialize in the law must decide individually
whether they are attorney-psychologists or psychologist-attorneys. It is not
possible to be both. Science and the law play by wholly different sets of rules.
Yet, they play on the same fields, and therefore they have to decide by which
set of rules they will abide. The law is, at bottom, a normative institution. It
is also practical and pragmatic, but its success is measured by values and
morals. The law is a consumer of information with the purpose of producing
fair, just, equitable,, and efficient outcomes. Psychology is a producer of
information. It ought to transcend practical politics, seeking information that
transcends legal contexts and, if possible, social contexts. When producers
become consumers, they inevitably prefer their own product over all others.
And the products themselves will be tailored to the producers' consumption
preferences. A scientist who measures his or her success by the rules of the
law is no longer a scientist.
What this all means, then, is that the law decides how and whether to use
psychology. The law needs to be a sophisticated consumer of science. This,
in fact, is the principal lesson of the Daubert trilogy. Scientists certainly can
and should criticize the law for not using science well. But this is not the
same thing as saying that scientists should criticize the law for failing to use
science to some particular end.
For example, the Supreme Court did not employ science well in Lockhart
v. McCree,"° in which the issue was whether excluding certain jurors would
result in prosecution-prone juries.1 3 But proving this criticism does not
102. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
103. See Lockhart v. MeCree, 476 U.S. 162,165 (1986) (stating issue of case).
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support-the opposite conclusion, that the Court should have rested its decision
on the research. The law is allowed to decide that the empirical question has
become irrelevant or of little significance. In 1973, the Court chose viability
as the point at which the government could prohibit abortions, except in cases
where it was necessary to save the life of the mother.' At that time, viability,
a medical fact regarding the time when a fetus can survive outside of the
womb, was approximately atthe end ofthe second trimester. Clearly, this was
a convenient fact for establishing a compromise between the woman's right
of reproductive choice and the government's interest in the potential life of
the fetus. If medical technology were to move viability to the sixth week of
pregnancy, no one seriously would expect the Court to continue to employ this
fact. The Court could be criticized for using viability at all, or for its rela-
tively poor understanding ofthe medical technology upon which it relied. But
the science simply does not give the scientists any moral platform on which
to hold forth on the proper moment when abortion can, or cannot, be constitu-
tionally prohibited.
In the same way, the Court was in error in the recent case of Kansas v.
Hendricks05 when it ignored the entire issue of the reliability of predictions
of violence as regards commitment of so-called sexual predators."° This is
notto say that the outcome should have been different ifthe Court had consid-
ered and understood the research. Legal outcomes can be criticized only from
the law's perspective. To be sure, the research available is part of the equa-
tion. But the research, no matter how good it is, never dictates legal results.
Science simply cannot say what ought to be done with its findings.
In practical terms, then, as a science, psychology should be limited to
criticizing the law for failure to use its findings well. It cannot prescribe to
the law how to use its findings. This, in a somewhat roundabout way, returns
me to the matter with which I opened, Justice Breyer's question: What is
good psychology? Psychology is good when it is a science. It is a science to
the extent that it limits itselfto the empirical world, and it can be measured by
how well it tests its hypotheses. The measure to be used for psychology must
be the measure used for all sciences. Psychology should be evaluated by its
success in explaining and predicting human behavior, just as meteorologists
are measured by their success at explaining and predicting the weather.
Many who work in the area of psychology and law, of course, own two
hats, being trained in both disciplines. But it is inappropriate to wear the two
104. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (prohibiting state proscription of
abortion prior to viability of fetus).
105. 521 U.S. 346 (1997).
106. See Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 357-59 (1997) (discussing predictions of
future violence).
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hats at the same time. Nonetheless, those who wear law hats should be
heartily encouraged to consort with those who wear science hats. The two
groups should get together and discuss and debate the intersection of these
two great professions. These institutions have much to learn from one an-
other. But at the end of the day, they each must go home to their respective
houses. They work together, but they cannot live under the same rooft or by
the same rules. I remember that one of my father's favorite sayings when I
reached adolescence was: "If you live under my roof, you have to obey my
rules." Well, that is true for law and psychology too. Science and the law are
two wholly different institutions, with very different histories, different
methodologies, different standards for success, and different objectives. In
our world they are both indispensable, but not reconcilable. We should not
wish them to be. In some ways, they are like the branches of the federal
government, which were created, in part, to check the excesses and jealousies
of one another. They share power, but they also check one another's power.
In our world, the three great institutions are science, law, and religion. They
should retain their separate identities, the better to accomplish their separate
objectives, and the better to check the power of the other two. We should no
more wish that science and law merge than we should wish that either science
or law merge with religion.
IL7 The Legal Academy
Although Mariana Azuela was correct that thinkers prepare the revolu-
tion while bandits carry it out, 1' ° the legal academy has been at best uneven
in its support for, and understanding of, this particular revolution. In fact,
some of the best work on behalf of the revolution has come fron the academy
that serves the federal judiciary, the Federal Judicial Center. The Center was
well ahead of the Daubert curve in publishing its Reference Manual on
Scientific Evidence in 1994.108 In contrast, the law school academy, although
very enthusiastic, has shown a disappointing lack of imagination in response
to the battles raging in the streets. The cause for this appears to be the same
malady that infects the legal world more generally: little or no appreciation
for the scientific method and scientific culture. Academics, however, have
less of an excuse than other legal actors because they are in the business of
education.
An adequate treatment of this subject would require an extensive study
of the backgrounds of legal academics, the content of their scholarship, and
the curriculums of the nearly two-hundred ABA accredited law schools in the
107. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
108. Ra EcE MANUAL ON ScmN'nc EVIDENCE (1994).
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United States. I can offer only a few passing observations about the state of
the legal academy in regard to the ongoing scientific revolution. The subject,
however, is well worth the attention of social scientists. My remarks here
mainly concern the quality of the scholarship to date and the failure of the law
schools to integrate more fully the scientific method into their curriculums.
On the positive side, legal scholars have done much to publicize and
chronicle the changing times. The law reviews have been teeming with
articles on the law and science connection,' ° and there have been more than
a few symposia, such as the one that this Essay joins, on the subject."' But
much that has been written has not been well informed by the scientific
method. Many law professors are science neophytes and their scholarship
reflects their limited background in the subject.
Because Daubert was ostensibly an evidence case, evidence scholars
were the first group to jump headlong into the fray. Some were loyalists, but
many others welcomed the new regime. Most of this group, though overall a
rigorously thoughtful and thorough bunch, had no special backgrounds in
science. Unfortunately, there was little time to gain any such background, and
a substantial portion of the early scholarship manifests a profound naivete
about how science is done. There are, of course, many exceptions, and over
time the scholarship seems to be improving. Buttoo much of it is improving as
a consequence of the Supreme Court's leading the way. Lower courts would
benefit greatly from more intellectual leadership from the academy.
Without attacking any individual scholars, the best illustration of this
phenomenon was legal scholars' reactions to the question whether Daubert
applied to so-called non-scientific evidence. Many evidence scholars thought
that it did not, based upon the belief that the Daubert test applied only to
conventional science. By conventional, they meant experimental research.
This approach had two fundamental flaws.
The most obvious flaw was that Daubert itself did not involve a conven-
tional experimental science because the issue there concerned the admissibil-
ity of expert testimony based on epidemiology. Epidemiology is based on
research designs that measure associations and in which no independent
variables are actively manipulated. In fact, it was an odd argument to follow
because the question whether Daubert applied to non-scientific evidence
eventually came to the Court in Kumho, a case that involved engineering
expertise. Epidemiology is hardly more conventionally scientific than engi-
neering."' Arguably, engineering is the "harder" science.
109. Seel FARiGmANETAL, supra note 34, § 1-3.0n.2, at ll (citingarticles).
110. See generally Symposium, Evidence After the Death of Frye, 15 CARDOZO L. REV.
1745 (1994).
111. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 141 (1999) ("This case requires
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The second flaw was one of a basic misunderstanding of the nature of
science. The scientific method is not one method. Different sciences require
different methods, depending on the nature, difficulty, and context of the
hypotheses of interest. Frequently, the same question requires a potpourri of
methods in order to approach an answer. For instance, Daubert concerned
whether Bendectin causes birth defects.' Obviously, no one proposes experi-
mentally testing this hypothesis on humans. It must be studied using a variety
of methods, ranging from clinical observation to animal studies to epidemiol-
ogy. Researchers must assess all of this evidence together in order to decide
whether Bendectin causes birth defects. The same is true for many of the
applied sciences that the law must deal with on a daily basis.
Ironically, one of the sciences that has received little legal scrutiny by
courts, lawyers, and academics is also one of the few areas that lends itself to
rigorous experimental test: the forensic sciences. Much more than psychol-
ogy and medicine, forensic sciences such as fingerprinting, firearms identifi-
cation, handwriting identification, bitemarks, toolmarks, and so on, lend
themselves to extensive laboratory evaluation. Why the law has not yet
insisted that these tests be done appears to be more a function of politics than
anything having to do with the difficulty of doing the science.
Ifthose who specifically write in the area of science and law demonstrate
some lack of familiarity with the subject, those who teach and write in other
areas seem to have even less appreciation for the changes occurring in the
field. I must admit, however, that this impression is only that and is not
informed by empirical research. Still, in informal discussions with colleagues
at my school and others, as well as in conversations with my students, it
appears that the core legal curriculum has yet to integrate the realities of
scientific evidence. Given the amount of expertise that an attorney is likely
to confront in a lifetime of practice, it should be something of a scandal that
core courses hardly touch on it. For instance, criminal law classes should
delve deeply into the forensic sciences. Torts classes should consider the
sciences of toxicology and epidemiology behind toxic torts and the myriad
engineers that litigants introduce in product liability cases. Even if it is
somewhat unrealistic to expect these introductory courses to spend substantial
time on scientific topics, law schools should offer a wide menu of science and
law courses for students to take after their first year of study.
If the law is ever to fully incorporate science into its decision making,
law schools will need to provide the basic training. Law schools are in the
us to decide how Daubert applies to testimony of engineers and other experts -who are not scien-
tists.").
112. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993) (stating facts
of case).
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business of teaching critical thinking, or what we fancifully call thinking like
a lawyer. Now, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is no longer
possible to be a critical thinking generalist if you cannot think critically about
science.
IV Conclusion
Despite the seeming pessimism that runs throughout this Essay, I should
say that I am basically optimistic about the future of the law and science
connection. Finally, with the Daubert trilogy, and other developments, the
law has joined the scientific revolution. Over the next twenty years or so,
lawyers and judges will become increasingly sophisticated consumers of
science. While the old-order continues to resist, the triumph of the new
regime is only a matter of time. These reforms originally were prompted by
events prior to Daubert as the courts increasingly were deluged with toxic
torts, DNA profiling, and psychological syndromes. In the future, the human
genome project, intellectual property issues, forensic science, and, undoubt-
edly, more psychological syndromes will push the courts to greater levels of
scientific sophistication. Judges who learn multiple regression analysis in
order to assess epidemiological research will have that knowledge when they
confront the next psychological disorder. An understanding of base-rates in
DNA profiling should translate into knowledge of base-rates in psychological
predictions. All of this means that psychology will confront increasingly
vigilant gatekeepers. Scientists should welcome this vigilance. Someday,
Daubert will be understood not only as a wake-up call to the law. It also will
be seen as a wake-up call to the sciences and specialties who seek to influence
the law. Whether it is toxicologists who serve plaintiff's attorneys, forensic
scientists who serve prosecutors, or psychologists with their own political
agendas, these sciences will be forced to improve their methods or seek
employment elsewhere. We already have begun to see this with the forensic
sciences, as the FBI scrambles to begin validating such old-standards as
ballistics, toolnarks, handwriting, and even fingerprinting. Clinical medicine
is likely to be next. The day of reckoning for psychology is near. The
Daubert trilogy thus signifies the opening canon-fire of the scientific revolu-
tion in law. Alchemists, philosophers, moralists, theologians, and hired guns
are the fitting victims of this revolution. As Yeats wrote: "Hurrah for revolu-
tion.
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